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In the midst of the Great Depression, John Maynard Keynes wrote that many  
 
decisions where the full effects will not be known for some time “can only be taken  
 
as the result of animal spirits,” which Keynes defined as “a spontaneous urge to action  
 
rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative  
 
benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.”1  Historically, as well as in our present  
 
age, one possible manifestation of this type of behavior might very well be the  
 
phenomenon which has become known, metaphorically, as a “bubble.”  What role, if any,  
 
has the presence of asset market bubbles played in the current cycle of global financial  
 
turbulence?  If the determination is made that developments of this type has made their  
 
presence known in these times, then what kind of insights from Christian reflection   
 
might be brought to bear on the discussion over possible institutional, regulatory, and  
 
educational responses that would be intended to reduce the likelihood of a repeat  
 
performance in the future? 
 
The opinion of economists with respect to the precise definition of a bubble   
 
remains divided.  Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz has maintained that such an event exists  
 
when the price of a asset rises “only (emphasis in the original) because investors believe  
 
that the selling price will be high tomorrow.”2  This definition implies that changes in the  
 
price of these assets are unrelated to what Peter Garber has referred to as “fundamentals,”  
 
which “are a collection of variables that we believe should drive asset prices.”3  The  
 
debate over the existence of asset bubbles is closely related to the question of whether or  
 
                                                 
1
 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money.  New York:  Harcourt, 
Brace, and Co., 1936, p. 161. 
2
 Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Symposium on Bubbles.”  Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 4, no. 2 (Spring, 
1990):  13. 
3
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not contemporary economists still adhere to the assumption that Nobel Laureate Herbert  
 
Simon characterized as the “classical theory of omniscient rationality.”4  If human  
 
decision-makers truly possess such qualities, then there should be, by definition, no  
 
changes in asset prices which cannot be explained in terms of underlying fundamentals.   
 
From the standpoint of Christian theology, the omniscient half of such an outlook, if it is  
 
meant literally, is inherently problematic, because Christians believe that only God  
 
possesses perfect knowledge and that human beings are always making decisions in the  
 
presence of some degree of ignorance.5  With respect to rationality, Stephen LeRoy has  
 
written that the meaning of this term “in economic discussion appears to have  
 
changed in recent years” to one that views rationality as “a conceptual tool used in  
 
formulating economic models,” as opposed to “a substantive hypothesis about the  
 
world.” 6 For example, Matthias Klaes and Esther Mirjam-Sent have concluded that  
 
Simon was probably the first economist or social scientist to have employed the phrase  
 
“bounded rationality” in order to refer to a more limited set of assumptions about human  
 
capabilities.7  Simon defined this concept as consisting of “rational choice that takes into  
 
account the cognitive limitations of the decision-maker – limitations of both knowledge  
 
and computational capability.”8  According to Thomas Sargent, this approach, compared  
 
with other definitions of rational behavior,  no longer assumes that decision-makers  
                                                 
4
 Herbert A. Simon, “Rational Decision-Making in Business Organizations.”  American Economic Review, 
vol. 69, no. 4 (September 1979):  496. 
5
 On a related issue, Philip Booth has argued that Christian thought and Austrian economic theory share a 
common belief that “the accumulated knowledge of previous generations is an important complement to 
the absence of perfect knowledge within any given generation.”  “Christianity, the Market Economy, and 
the Limits to Human Knowledge.”  Economic Affairs, vol. 25, no. 2 (June 2005):  45.   
6
 Stephen F. LeRoy, “Rational Exuberance.”  Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 42, no. 3 (September 
2004):  794.   
7
 Matthias Klaes and Esther Mirjam-Sent, “A Conceptual History of the Emergence of Bounded 
Rationality.”  History of Political Economy, vol. 37, no. 1 (2005):  37. 
8
 Herbert A. Simon, “Bounded Rationality.”  John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman (eds.),  The 
New Palgrave:  A Dictionary of Economics, vol. 1.  London:  Macmillan, 1987, p. 267. 
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maintain consistent perceptions, but instead update the rules by which they make choices  
 
as new information becomes available.9 Even though these revised notions of human  
 
rationality have become generally accepted elements of the neoclassical economic 
 
paradigm, there is still a tendency to characterize asset bubbles as a manifestation of  
 
irrational behavior that cannot exist, by definition, within the formal models that are  
 
utilized in order to explain market behavior.  Given the recent turbulence in global  
 
financial markets, and the current experience of an international economic downturn, it 
 
seems highly unlikely that large numbers of people would intentionally make decisions  
 
that would lead to such outcomes if they had known in advance, or even had a rough  
 
idea, that this would be the case.  As LeRoy has observed, “It is a testament to  
 
economists’ capacity for abstraction that they have accepted without question that an  
 
intricate theoretical argument against bubbles has somehow migrated from the pages of  
 
Econometrica to the floor of the New York Stock Exchange.”10 
 
 In his well-known book on the history of financial crises, Charles Kindleberger  
 
wrote that while “there can be no doubt that rationality in markets in the long run is a  
 
useful hypothesis . . . the pages of history are strewn with language, admittedly imprecise 
 
and possibly hyperbolic, that allows no other interpretation than occasional irrational 
 
markets and destabilizing speculation.”11  Kindleberger went on to identify six distinct,  
 
but related, causes for these kind of developments, which he described as “manias” and 
 
“panics”: 
 
                                                 
9
 Thomas J. Sargent, Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 1993, 
p. 34. 
10
 LeRoy, p. 801. 
11
 Charles P. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes:  A History of Financial Crises.  New York:  John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996, pp. 21-22. 
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1) Mob psychology; 
 
2) Changes in behavior at different stages of a continuing process, where people   
 
start out acting rationally, but then become increasingly irrational with the  
 
passage of time;  
 
3) Differences in rationality among different groups of traders, investors, or  
 
speculators; 
 
4) The fallacy of composition; 
 
5) The failure of a market with rational expectations with respect to the quality  
 
of a reaction to a given stimulus to estimate the right quantity (emphases in  
 
the original); 
 
6) Economic actors may choose the wrong model, fail to take account of a  
 
particular type of information, or suppress information that does not 
 
conform to the model which has been adopted.12 
 
 How might we apply a historical understanding of previous financial crises to the  
 
process of constructing an explanatory framework for our current situation?  In one of the  
 
appendices to his previously cited volume, Kindleberger categorized 35 separate financial  
 
crises, dating from the early 17th century to the last decade of the 20th century, on the  
 
basis of the following criteria: 
 
1) The affected countries; 
 
2) The significant economic and political events that were taking place  
 
concurrently; 
 
3) The object of preceding speculative activity; 
 
4) The source of any preceding monetary expansion; 
                                                 
12
 Ibid., p. 23. 
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5) The point in time where speculative activity reached its peak; 
 
6) The point in time at which the mania reaches the crisis stage; 
 
7) The relevant lenders of last resort.13 
 
In the context of our current difficulties, it would probably be easier to construct a  
 
list of the unaffected countries around the globe.  In recent months, financial markets on  
 
every continent have experienced significant decreases in asset prices.14  Particular  
 
nations, most notably the United States and the United Kingdom, have also undergone a  
 
major decline in housing prices.15  Several political and economic events, which took  
 
place at the end of the last decade and the beginning of this one, each made a contribution  
 
to the process that has led us to our current predicament.  The end of the “dot.com”  
 
bubble in technology and Internet-related financial assets, as well as the scandals  
 
surrounding companies such as Enron and Arthur Anderson, fostered a reluctance to  
 
invest in stocks and a search for alternative avenues for profitable investment.  As has  
 
been the case in our present time, these developments in the financial sector made their  
 
presence felt in the real economy, as the United States experienced a recession from  
 
March to November of 2001.16  The Federal Reserve responded to this situation by  
 
implementing an expansionary monetary policy, lowering the intended Federal funds rate  
 
11 times in 2001 alone.17  The decline in market interest rates which followed the Federal  
                                                 
13
 Ibid., pp. 203-212. 
14
 In its year-end review of markets and finance, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Dow Jones World 
Index, measured in U.S. dollars, fell by 42.9% in 2008 when the United States was included, and by 46% 
when the United States was excluded.  Joanna Slater, “Global Markets Are in for Another Tough Slog.”  
The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2009, p. R4.  This trend continued into the first two months of 2009. 
15
 The Economist stated, in a special report last autumn on the world economy, that “on a quarterly basis 
prices are now falling in at least half the 20 countries” in its index of housing prices.”  Zanny Minton 
Beddoes, “When fortune frowned.”  The Economist, October 11, 2008, p. 4.   
16
 The National Bureau of Economic Research.  “Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions.”  
http://wwwdev.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html  Accessed 13 January 2009. 
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Reserve’s actions served to encourage investment in the housing sector.  The appeal of  
 
housing as an asset choice may also have been reinforced by a shift in the public mood,  
 
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the direction of an intensified  
 
preference for safety and security.  Whether or not bricks and mortar was a less risky  
 
investment choice than stocks, bonds, or other financial assets, it was literally and  
 
figuratively “closer to home,” and less likely to be the subject of any future acts of  
 
terrorism.   While one might debate the relative weight that should be attached to these  
 
various factors, the results seem reasonably clear in retrospect:   an increase in the market  
 
price of housing and related assets as a result of the higher level of demand.  This  
 
increase in spending was facilitated by financial institutions, who lowered their lending  
 
standards, particularly in the area of what have become known as “subprime” mortgages,  
 
 which were extended to borrowers with lower credit ratings.18  Although much of this  
 
activity took place within an American context, the effects were transmitted globally as  
 
many of these mortgages were packaged into complex securities that were purchased by  
 
investors around the world.  As the American and global economies continued to expand  
 
in the middle portion of this decade, the Federal Reserve changed the content of its  
 
monetary policy, raising the intended Federal funds rate on 17 separate occasions, each  
 
time in 25-basis point increments, over a two-year period from 2004 to 2006.19  This  
 
change in direction, however, was not sufficient to allow the housing market to deflate in  
 
a gradual manner.  As the economy of the United States began, in 2007, to move towards  
                                                                                                                                                 
17
 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  “The Federal Reserve Board:  Open Market 
Operations.”  http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm/  Accessed 13 January 2009. 
18
 William C. Wood has defined subprime lending as the extension of a loan to a borrower with a credit 
rating below 620, on a standard scale of 300 to 850.  “Subprime Lending and Social Justice:  A Biblical 
Perspective.”  Journal of Markets and Morality, vol. 11, no. 2 (Fall, 2008):  196. 
19
 “The Federal Reserve Board:  Open Market Operations.”  Accessed 29 January 2009. 
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the beginning of the current recession in December of that year,20 increasing numbers of  
 
homeowners began experiencing difficulty in making the payments on their mortgages.  
 
As time passed, this situation began to threaten the financial stability of those institutions  
 
who had extended these loans, as well as those who had purchased securities that were  
 
linked to these instruments.  The Federal Reserve began to respond to these developments  
 
in September of 2007 by lowering the intended Federal funds rate, a practice that it has  
 
repeated nine times since then in the hope of cushioning the effect of these events on the  
 
real economy. 21  Other central banks around the world have implemented similar policies  
 
which are designed to provide liquidity to the world financial system. 22 While these  
 
measures may be judged, with the passage of time, to have been useful in containing the  
 
damage, they were unable to prevent the global financial crisis that peaked in October of  
 
2008, and which has now turned into the most significant downturn in the global  
 
economy since the end of the Second World War.  Olivier Blanchard, chief economist at  
 
the International Monetary Fund, has summarized this chain of events as follows: 
 
 “In the context of rapid global integration and deep and complex interconnections 
between financial institutions, the crisis quickly moved across assets, markets, and 
economies.  The rest is history, or, more precisely, history in the making.”23 
 
 Part of the “history in the making” to which Blanchard refers is the beginning of 
 
what is reasonably certain to be a long process of debate over the assignment of  
 
responsibility for the chain of events that has brought us to this point in international 
                                                 
20
 “Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions.” Accessed 3 February 2009. 
21
 “The Federal Reserve Board:  Open Market Operations.”  Accessed 3 February 2009. 
22
 The Wall Street Journal recently reported that four major central banks – the Bank of England, the Bank 
of Canada, the European Central Bank, and the Reserve Bank of Australia – were expected to reduce their 
benchmark interest rates to levels similar to those which have been already set by the Federal Reserve.  
Joanna Slater, “Dollar Gains Favor As Zero Rates Go Global.”  The Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2009, p. 
C1. 
23
 Olivier Blanchard, “Cracks in the System:  Repairing the damaged global economy.”  Finance and 
Development, vol. 45, no. 4 (December 2008):  8. 
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economic history.  John Taylor, for one, has put forth the case for policy and regulatory  
 
failure as a major causal explanation, arguing that “monetary excesses were the main 
 
cause of the (housing) boom,” and that agencies such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac  
 
“were encouraged to expand and buy mortgage-backed securities, including those formed 
 
with the risky subprime mortgages.”24  Robert Shiller, by contrast, has maintained,  
 
employing Keynes’ metaphor of animal spirits, that the recent and current state of our  
 
financial markets is a matter of trust; excessively high during the period when what  
 
Shiller refers to as “complicated strategies of securitization” were being developed, and  
 
excessively low in the aftermath of the “wreckage of formerly towering financial  
 
institutions.”25  Not surprisingly, their alternative “diagnoses” of the causes of our  
 
economic “illness” lead these two economists to purpose different “remedies.”  Professor  
 
Taylor maintains that “early on, policy makers misdiagnosed the crisis as one of liquidity,  
 
and prescribed the wrong treatment.”26  He criticizes the creation of the Term Auction  
 
Facility, the passage of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, and the Federal Reserve’s  
 
reductions in the target Federal funds rate in late 2007 and early 2008.27  Professor  
 
Shiller, as it turns out, contends that the various interventions by the U.S. Treasury and  
 
the Federal Reserve “so far have been in the right direction,” and his primary critique of  
 
the Obama Administration’s fiscal initiatives is that they should be more extensive in  
                                                 
24
 John B. Taylor, “How Government Created the Financial Crisis.”  The Wall Street Journal, February 9, 
2009, p. A19. 
25
 Robert J. Shiller, “Animal Spirits Depend on Trust.”  The Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2009, p. A15.  
A similar observation was previously made by James Grant:  “If the confidence deficit seems so high, it’s 
because the preceding confidence surplus was full to overflowing.  People suspended critical judgment.  
They accepted at face value the pretensions of central bankers and the competence of central bankers.  Not 
one professional investor in 50, probably, doubted that wads of subprime mortgages could be refashioned 
into bonds that were just as creditworthy as U.S. Treasurys.”  “The Confidence Game.”  The Wall Street 
Journal, October 18-19, 2008, p. W1. 
26
 Taylor, ibid. 
27
 Ibid. 
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order to have a greater effect on public confidence.28  While it should be noted that these 
 
two perspectives are not mutually exclusive, at least in terms of their respective views on  
 
the origins of the crisis, it also bears mentioning that the discussion has expanded in  
 
recent months to include an examination of what might be regarded as more foundational  
 
issues with respect to the role of finance in a market economy, or even the market system  
 
itself.  In a column published just before Christmas last year, Christopher Caldwell  
 
opined that “the public has no settled idea about whether the global finance system seized 
 
up last summer because it was mismanaged or because it was, in a moral and  
 
metaphysical sense, wrong.”29  Some Christian commentators have been quick to agree 
 
with the observations offered by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, that  
 
“the credit crunch should be seen as a welcome ‘reality check’ to a climate of  
 
‘unsustainable greed.’”30  In fact, one almost detects a note of glee in some Christian 
 
reflections on recent events and our current state of affairs, viewing the collapse of asset 
 
bubbles and the resulting financial instability as a manifestation of Divine Judgment on 
 
our individual and collective economic sins.  Left-leaning observers have used the crisis  
 
as a platform to question the moral standing of financial markets and globalization,31  
 
while some on the Right have emphasized the lack of personal responsibility associated 
                                                 
28
 Shiller, ibid. 
29
 Christopher Caldwell, “Time for some morality trades.” Financial Times, December 19, 2008.  
http://www.ft.com/  Accessed 20 December 2008. 
30
 Joe Parkinson, “Church Sees Lesson in Crisis.”  The Wall Street Journal, December 19, 2008, p. C5.  
Gordon Brown, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, responded to the Archbishop’s comments with 
a Biblical reference of his own.  Drawing upon the parable of the Good Samaritan, he said that “I think the 
Archbishop will agree with me that every time someone becomes unemployed or loses their home or a 
small business fails it is our duty to act and we should not walk by on the other side when people are facing 
problems.”  Philippe Naughton, “Brown slaps down Archbishop of Canterbury in credit crunch row.”  
Times Online.  December 18,2008.  http://www.timesonline.co.uk/  Accessed 19 December 2008. 
31
 In a published interview last autumn, Edward Hadas characterized the conclusion that the financial crisis 
discredits the entire market system  as “a cause looking for an opportunity.”  “Is Capitalism Morally 
Bankrupt?”  Standpoint Online, November, 2008.  http://www.standpointmag.co.uk/print/573/   Accessed 
29 December 2008. 
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with a culture of over-consumption and high levels of debt.  Philip Booth has cautioned  
 
believers against such a rush to judgment, arguing that “many factors have created the  
 
perfect storm.”32  In addition to errors of judgment in monetary policy, Booth lists  
 
regulatory mistakes, an absence of prudence and caution by financial market participants,  
 
a low level of saving and excessive borrowing by households, and the market transitions  
 
which “have diminished the value of relationships in financial services and replaced a  
 
culture of trust with one of compliance.”33  In some respects, it would be simpler if the  
 
origins of the crisis could be limited to problems that are easily remedied, in a relative  
 
sense, by changes in monetary policy and the regulatory framework which governs  
 
financial markets.  Policymakers can take actions which are designed to restrict the  
 
supply of money and credit in an attempt to maintain interest rates at a certain level, and  
 
supervisory agencies can tighten the rules which govern borrowing, lending, and the  
 
purchase of various assets.  In spite of the merits that might be associated with these 
 
measures, none of them can ensure that asset bubbles will not make their presence known  
 
again at some point in the future, just as they have in the past.   
 
For the purpose of argument, let us suppose that people around the world,  
 
in the aftermath of recent events, acquire the new perspective on economics and finance –  
 
a more altruistic and less selfish outlook – that Archbishop Williams identified as a sign  
 
of repentance.34  Christian economists would certainly rejoice if global markets came to  
 
be characterized by a higher degree of trust and a lower level of greed.35  Such a turn of  
                                                 
32
 Philip Booth, “Bishops should tread carefully in their response to the financial crisis.  Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 4 November 2008.  http://www.iea.org.uk/record.jsp?type=pressArticle&ID=378/  
Accessed 7 November 2008. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Naughton, ibid. 
35
 Philip Booth has advised caution in this area, saying that “greed was probably not the main failing” in 
financial markets, and that “this is just as well because it is difficult to eradicate!”  Booth, ibid. 
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events, however desirable, would not change the fact that all of us, to paraphrase the  
 
Apostle Paul, “see through a glass darkly,” and make decisions in a state of partial  
 
ignorance, compounded by the reality that some of the information that we do possess  
 
may not be accurate or complete.36  James Grant maintains that one of the reasons why  
 
investors were so eager to purchase mortgage-backed securities during the run-up to our  
 
present circumstances – “at interest rates only a few tenths of a percentage point higher  
 
than Treasury-bill yields” - is that they were assigned a triple-A rating at the time.37  With  
 
respect to these evaluations of risk, Charles Goodhart has concluded that “prior to August  
 
2007, there was some general satisfaction among the monetary authorities that the  
 
undesirable and excessive under-pricing of risk” which had taken place previously “was  
 
in the process of being reversed.”38  All of this seems quite consistent with one of Charles  
 
Kindleberger’s historical catalysts for the emergence of financial crises over the  
 
centuries:  metaphorical sins of commission (the choice of an inaccurate model or the  
 
suppression of information that does not conform to that model) or omission (failure to  
 
account for a particular type of information.)  It also mirrors the judgment by Martin  
 
Wolf that “the benefit and risk of finance are two sides of one coin . . . The risk is that the  
 
resulting pyramids of promises are vulnerable to fraud, deception, and irreducible  
 
uncertainty and so to successive fits of optimism and panic.39 
 
 The debate over the causes of the global financial crisis and recession, including  
 
the role of global asset bubbles in this process, will no doubt continue for years to come; 
                                                 
36
 In his article on the points of tangency between Christian thought and Austrian economics, Philip Booth 
states that “perhaps the most important commonality” between the two “is that they both stress the limits to 
‘pretending that we know more than we do.’”  Booth, op. cit., p. 45. 
37
 Grant, p. W3. 
38
 C. A. E. Goodhart, “The background to the 2007 financial crisis.”  International Economics and 
Economic Policy, vol. 4, no. 4 (February 2008):  331. 
39
 Martin Wolf, “Risks and rewards of today’s unshackled global finance.”  Financial Times, 27 June 2007, 
p. 11. 
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in the words of Charles Goodhart, “it may take quite a long time before a comprehensive 
 
history of this crisis can be written.”40  Goodhart also points out that all of us who are  
 
trying to understand and explain these events bring our personal views to the discussion, 
 
in a manner that is similar to the story of the group of blind men who each feel different  
 
parts of an elephant.41  In that spirit, this paper would agree with the assertion that policy  
 
and regulatory errors tell part of the story, but as Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende of  
 
the Netherlands recently pointed out in a public statement preceding the recently  
 
concluded G20 summit in London, rules and oversight will never be “watertight,”  
 
especially at the global level.42  Fallen human beings are also prone to the sin of greed,  
 
but this is not a new phenomenon, and it is quite unlikely to disappear on this side of the  
 
full realization of the Kingdom of God.  Another manifestation of human imperfection,  
 
which is more correctable in nature, is the observation that we make decisions in the  
 
presence of imperfect information and inaccurate interpretation of the information that  
 
we do possess, as well as the fluctuations in our “animal spirits.”  Therefore, perhaps the  
 
greatest contribution that Christian economists can make in these times is to point the  
 
way towards a more humble and prudential direction for the future of the financial sector,  
 
so that the consequences of our mistakes might be less severe, in a manner that is  
 
analogous to reducing one’s rate of speed when driving in inclement weather.  No one  
 
should pretend that this will be an easy task, particularly in a global economic  
 
environment that, despite the recent resurgence of economic nationalism in response to  
 
our present difficulties, is likely to remain highly integrated.  As British Prime Minister  
 
                                                 
40
 Goodhart, ibid. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Government of the Netherlands.  “Statement of Prime Minister Balkenende regarding the G20.”  Video 
presentation.  http://www.government.nl/News/Press_releases_and_news_items/  Accessed 1 April 2009. 
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Gordon Brown recently noted at St. Paul’s Cathedral in London, in remarks that were  
 
delivered in advance of the  G20 summit, the same process of globalization that has  
 
“lifted millions out of poverty has also unleashed forces that have totally overwhelmed  
 
the old national rules and the systems of financial oversight.”43  In conclusion, Max  
 
Stackhouse offers the following words of encouragement in the direction of this ongoing  
 
mission: 
 
 “(The system of modern banking institutions) was built on efforts to form shared 
interests with a covenanted sense of being responsible trustees of other people’s money 
and trustworthy stewards of institutions.  These institutions would in turn be able to 
generate wealth for the commonwealth under the watchful eye of a just God.  Joint  
multinational intervention and civil societal reformation now must reconstruct a 
foundational ethic like this for our globalizing era.”44 
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 The Office of the Prime Minister.  “Speech and Q&A at St. Paul’s Cathedral.”  31 March 2009.  
http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page18858/ Accessed 2 April 2009. 
44
 Max Stackhouse, “Why Theology in International Affairs?”  The Review of Faith & International 
Affairs, vol. 7, no. 1 (Spring 2009):  76. 
15 
 
Reference List 
 
 
Beddoes, Zanny Minton.  “When fortune frowned.” The Economist:  A special report 
 on the global economy.  October 11, 2008. 
 
Blanchard, Olivier.  “Cracks in the System:  Repairing the damaged global economy.” 
 Finance and Development, vol. 45, no. 4 (December 2008):  8-10. 
 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  “The Federal Reserve Board:  Open 
 Market Operations.”  http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm/ 
 
Booth, Philip.  “Christianity, the Market Economy, and the Limits to Human  
 Knowledge.”  Economic Affairs, vol. 25, no. 2 (June 2005):  44-45. 
 
_______.  “Bishops should tread carefully in their response to the financial crisis.” 
 Institute of Economic Affairs, 4 November 2008.  http://www.iea.org.uk/ 
 
Caldwell, Christopher.  “Time for some morality trades.”  Financial Times, December 
 19, 2008.   http://www.ft.com/ 
 
Eatwell, John, Milgate, Murray, and Newman, Peter (Eds.).  The New Palgrave:  A 
 Dictionary of Economics, vol. 1.  London:  Macmillan, 1987. 
 
Garber, Peter.  Famous First Bubbles:  The Fundamentals of Early Manias.  Cambridge,  
 MA:  MIT Press, 2000. 
 
Goodhart, C. A. E.  “The background to the 2007 financial crisis.”  International 
 Economics and Economic Policy, vol. 4, no. 4 (February 2008):  331-346. 
 
Government of the Netherlands.  “Statement of Prime Minister Balkenende regarding 
 regarding the G20.”  Video presentation.  http://www.government.nl/ 
 
Grant, James.  “The Confidence Game.”  The Wall Street Journal, October 18-19, 2008,  
 pp. W1, W3. 
 
“Is Capitalism Morally Bankrupt?”  Standpoint Online, November, 2008.   
 http://www.standpointmag.co.uk/ 
 
Keynes, John Maynard.  The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money.  New  
 York:  Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1936. 
 
Kindleberger, Charles P.  Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises.   
 New York:  John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996.  
 
 
16 
 
Klaes, Matthias, and Mirjam-Sent, Esther.  “A Conceptual History of the Emergence of 
 Bounded Rationality.”  History of Political Economy, vol. 37, no. 1 (2005):   
 27-59. 
 
LeRoy, Stephen F.  “Rational Exuberance.”  Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 42,  
 no. 3 (September 2004):   783-804. 
 
National Bureau of Economic Research.  “Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions.” 
http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html/ 
 
Naughton, Philippe.  “Brown slaps down Archbishop of Canterbury in credit crunch 
 row.”  Times Online.  December 18, 2008.  http://www.timesonline.co.uk/ 
 
Office of the Prime Minister.  “Speech and Q&A at St. Paul’s Cathedral.”  31 March 
 2009.  http://www.number10.gov.uk/ 
 
Parkinson, Joe.  “Church Sees Lesson in Crisis.”  The Wall Street Journal, December 
 19, 2008, p. C5. 
 
Sargent, Thomas J.  Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics.  New York:  Oxford  
 University Press, 1993. 
 
Shiller, Robert J.  “Animal Spirits Depend on Trust.”  The Wall Street Journal, January  
 27, 2009, p. A15. 
 
Simon, Herbert A.  “Rational Decision-Making in Business Organizations.”  American 
 Economic Review, vol. 69, no. 4 (September 1979):  493-513. 
 
Slater, Joanna.  “Global Markets Are in for Another Tough Slog.”  The Wall Street  
 Journal, January 2, 2009, p. R4. 
 
_______.  “Dollar Gains Favor as Zero Rates Go Global”  The Wall Street Journal,  
 March 3, 2009, p. C1. 
 
Stackhouse, Max.  “Why Theology in International Affairs?”  The Review of Faith & 
 International Affairs, vol. 7, no. 1 (Spring 2009):  73-76. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E.  “Symposium on Bubbles.”  Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 4,  
 no. 2 (Spring 1990):  13-18. 
 
Taylor, John B.  “How Government Created the Financial Crisis.”  The Wall Street 
 Journal, February 9, 2009, p. A19. 
 
Wolf, Martin.  “Risks and rewards of today’s unshackled global finance.”  Financial 
 Times, June 27, 2007, p. 11. 
 
17 
 
Wood, William C.  “Subprime Lending and Social Justice:  A Biblical Perspective.   
 Journal of Markets and Morality, vol. 11, no. 2 (Fall 2008):  189-203. 
